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Abstract 
The paper analyzes the policy of OPEC and its influence on the global prices of oil during different periods of the history of Cartel 
since its foundation till now. Particularly it provides information about the prehistory of the establishment of the Organization in the be-
ginning of 60s of the last century and its First Steps. The research goes deeply through the role of the OPEC in causing the first oil shock 
(1973 – 1975) and the second oil shock (1979 – 1980). The paper includes the main reasons of the collapse of oil prices in the 1980s and 
the low prices on the “black gold” in the 1990s. Furthermore, it analyzes the role of OPEC and main reasons of the uprising prices on Oil 
in 2000s and policy of the cartel during International financial crises (2008 – 2010). 
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Introduction
Oil as a “black gold” is the top ranking commodity of 
our modern world. Some would say that the discovery of 
vast reserves of oil in the Middle East, North Sea, Siberia, 
Latin America is one of the great ironies of history because, 
since the period of the World War II, oil together with the 
natural gas has played a major role in the international 
economy. Due to this fact, many events in the International 
economic relations are depended on the production and 
trade by oil. Countries, possessing the large reserves logi-
cally should have a strong bargaining tool to influence their 
own political and economic status in the world economy. 
Indeed it is commonly believed that the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporter Countries (OPEC) and its member 
states are able to influence the economically developed 
states through their energy policy. 
Historical Development of OPEC
The Prehistory of the Establishment of the Organization 
and its First Steps
After World War II, oil exploration and production 
business in the Middle East was controlled by British 
company British Petroleum, French company “Compag-
nie Francaise de Petrole” (now Total), Royal Dutch/Shell 
(British-Dutch), and American Companies Standard Oil 
of New Jersey (now Exxon), Standard Oil of California 
(now Chevron) Texaco (now part of Chevron). Together 
they were called “Seven Sisters”. In 1959 the U.S. govern-
ment established a Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program 
(MOIP) restricting the amount of crude oil (and refined 
products) that could be imported into the United States.
The MOIP gave preferential treatment to oil imports 
from Mexico and Canada and this step has negatively ef-
fected on the “seven sisters” business and economic de-
velopment of the Middle East states. Due to the lack of 
technologies, those countries needed foreign investments 
to explore and produce the oil on their territories. In this 
cold war era Soviet oil production kicked up and around 
1960 the Soviet Union displaced Venezuela as the second 
largest oil producer in the World, behind the United States. 
Taking into account above-mentioned facts, oil pro-
ducer states from the “third World” started the thinking 
about coordinative policy related to the oil production and 
determination the world oil prices. The first attempt to-
wards the establishment of the Organization of the Petrole-
um Exporting Countries (OPEC) took place in 1949, when 
Venezuela conducted negotiations with the governments 
of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and suggested that 
they could exchange views and explore avenues for regular 
and closer communications between them.
The necessity for the development of closer coopera-
tion became more apparent in1959, when the First Arab 
Petroleum Congress took place in Cairo, Egypt. The Con-
gress adopted a resolution calling to oil companies to 
consult with the governments of the oil-producing states 
before unilaterally taking any decision on oil prices. Oth-
er decision was interrelated with the signing the general 
agreement on the establishment of an ‘Oil Consultation 
Commission’.
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The next conference from 10–14 September 1960 was 
held in Baghdad, attended by representatives of the Gov-
ernments of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezue-
la. It was this First Conference which established OPEC 
as a permanent intergovernmental organization of oil-ex-
porting developing nations that coordinates and unifies the 
petroleum policies of its Member states. Main purpose of 
OPEC represents to ensure the stabilization of oil prices 
in international oil markets, regular supply of petroleum 
to consuming nations, and affair return on capital to those 
investing in the petroleum industry.
Table 1: OPEC Member Countries (www.OPEC.org)
The first location of the OPEC Secretariat was in Ge-
neva, Switzerland, but later in April1965, the OPEC Con-
ference decided to move the Headquarters to Vienna, Aus-
tria. (Tedoradze, “OPEC in the World oil market”, 2011)
The First Oil Shock (1973 – 1975)
The first oil crisis started in October 1973 after the 
third Israeli-Arab war, when the members  OPEC together 
with Egypt, Syria and Tunisia proclaimed an oil embar-
go “in response to the U.S. decision to re-supply the Is-
raeli military” during the Yom Kippur war; it lasted un-
til March 1974. (Hubbert, 1956). During this period, the 
International price of oil increased from $3 per barrel to 
$12 per barrel. It caused the economic crisis. (Chitazde, 
May, 2004). Furthermore, some European nations and Ja-
pan sought to disassociate themselves from the US Middle 
East policy. Arab oil producers had also linked the end of 
the embargo with successful US efforts to create peace in 
the Middle East, which complicated the situation. To ad-
dress these developments, the Nixon Administration began 
parallel negotiations with both Arab oil producers to quit 
the embargo, and with Egypt, Syria, and Israel to arrange 
the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the Sinai Penin-
sula and the Golan Heights after the fighting stopped. By 
January 18, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had 
negotiated an Israeli armed forces withdrawal from parts of 
the Sinai. The promise of a negotiated settlement between 
Israel and Syria was sufficient to convince Arab oil pro-
ducers to lift the embargo in March 1974. By May, Israel 
agreed to withdraw from the Golan Heights. 
Independently, the OPEC members agreed to use their 
leverage over the world price setting mechanism for oil to 
stabilize their real incomes by raising world oil prices. This 
action followed several years of steep income declines af-
ter the recent failure of negotiations with the major West-
ern oil companies earlier in the month.
The effects of the embargo were immediate. OPEC 
forced the oil companies to increase payments drastically. 
The price of oil quadrupled by 1974 to nearly US$12 per 
barrel (75 US$/m3). This increase in the price of oil had a 
dramatic effect on oil exporting nations, for the countries 
of the Middle East who had long been dominated by the 
industrial powers were seen to have acquired control of a 
vital commodity. The traditional flow of capital reversed as 
the oil exporting nations accumulated vast wealth. 
 OPEC-member states in the developing world with-
held the prospect of nationalization of the companies’ 
holdings in their countries. Most notably, the Saudis ac-
quired operating control of Aramco, fully nationalizing it 
in 1980 under the leadership of Ahmed Zaki Yamani. As 
other OPEC nations followed suit, the cartel’s income 
soared. Saudi Arabia, awash with profits, undertook a se-
ries of ambitious five-year development plans, of which 
the most ambitious, begun in 1980, called for the expendi-
ture of $250 billion. Other cartel members also undertook 
major economic development programs.
Meanwhile, the shock produced chaos in the West. 
In the United States, the retail price of a gallon2 of gaso-
line (petrol) rose from a national average of 38.5 cents in 
May 1973 to 55.1 cents in June 1974. State governments 
requested citizens not put up Christmas lights, with Or-
egon banning Christmas as well as commercial lighting 
altogether. Politicians called for a national gas rationing 
program. Nixon requested gasoline stations to voluntar-
ily not sell gasoline on Saturday nights or Sundays; 90% 
of owners complied, which resulted in lines on weekdays. 
(Tedoradze, OPEC in the World oil market.Master thesis., 
2011). 
The embargo was not uniform across Europe. Of the 
nine members of the European Economic Community 
(EEC), the Netherlands faced a complete embargo, the 
United Kingdom and France received almost uninterrupted 
supplies (having refused to allow America to use their air-
fields and embargoed arms and supplies to both the Arabs 
and the Israelis), whilst the other six faced only partial cut-
backs. The UK had traditionally been an ally of Israel, and 
Harold Wilson’s government had supported the Israelis 
during the Six Day War, but his successor, Ted Heath, had 
reversed this policy in 1970, calling for Israel to withdraw 
to its pre-1967 borders. The members of the EEC had been 
unable to achieve a common policy during the first month 
of the Yom Kippur War. The Community finally issued 
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a statement on November 6, after the embargo and price 
rises had begun; widely seen as pro-Arab, this statement 
supported the Franco-British line on the war, and OPEC 
duly lifted its embargo from all members of the EEC. The 
price rises had a much greater impact in Europe than the 
embargo, particularly in the UK (where they combined 
with strikes by coal miners and railroad workers to cause 
an energy crisis over the winter of 1973-74, a major factor 
in the change of government). The UK, Germany, Switzer-
land, and Norway banned flying, driving and boating on 
Sundays. Sweden rationed gasoline and heating oil. The 
Netherlands imposed prison sentences for those who used 
more than their given ration of electricity. Ted Heath asked 
the British to heat only one room in their houses over the 
winter. 
Nevertheless, the 1973 oil shock provided dramatic 
evidence of the potential power of Third World resource 
suppliers in dealing with the developed world. The vast re-
serves of the leading Middle East producers guaranteed the 
region its strategic importance, but the politics of oil still 
proves dangerous for all concerned to this day.
Impact of the 1973-1975 oil shock on the world econ-
omy3:
•  The growth rate fell to 2.1% in 1974 and to 1.4 in 
1975.
•  The impact on worldwide trade also was tremen-
dous: after a growth rate of 12% in 1973, growth was nega-
tive in the following two years -5.4% and -7.3% in 1975. 
•  Another factor which has changed significantly was 
the flow of Foreign Direct Investment. While the annual 
Foreign Direct Investment Growth reached 40% in 1973the 
rate fell by half in 1974.
•  The oil shock of 1973-1974 had had a big effect on 
the US economy; however its GDP growth fell from more 
than 5.7% in 1973 to -0.5% and -0.19% in 1974 and 1975.
•  Another factor which was significantly affected by 
this oil shock is inflation, which was more than tripled 
from 1972 to 1974, from 3.3% to 11.1%.
•  These changes also impacted upon the unemploy-
ment rate, which rose from 4.9% in 1973 to approximately 
8.5% in 1975.
The Second Oil Shock (1979 – 1980)
The second oil crisis in the world occurred in the wake 
of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. Amid massive 
protests, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, fled 
his country in early 1979 and the Ayatollah Khomeini– Re-
ligious leader soon became the new leader of Iran. Mas-
sive demonstrations severely disrupted the Iranian energy 
sector, with production being greatly curtailed and exports 
suspended. When exports of the oil resources were later 
resumed under the new regime, they were inconsistent and 
at a lower volume, and this factor has effected on the situ-
ation around the international oil market and pushed prices 
up. Several OPEC member states increased production to 
offset the decline, and the overall loss in production was 
about 4 percent. However, a widespread panic influenced 
on the functioning the international stock exchanges, driv-
ing the price far higher than would be expected under nor-
mal situation.
These events were reflected on the economy and U.S. 
policy. American officials expressed in Richard Nixon’s 
administration decision to impose price controls on do-
mestic oil, which had helped cause shortages that led to 
gasoline lines during the 1973 Oil Crisis. Gasoline controls 
were repealed, but controls on domestic US oil remained. 
The Jimmy Carter administration began a phased dereg-
ulation of oil prices on April 5, 1979, when the average 
price of crude oil was US$15.85 per barrel (42 US gallons). 
Over the next one year period the price of crude oil rose to 
$39.50 per barrel. (Licklider, 1988). Deregulating domes-
tic oil price controls allowed domestic U.S. oil output to 
rise sharply from the large Prudhoe Bay fields, while oil 
imports fell sharply. Hence, long lines of vehicles appeared 
at gas stations, as they had six years earlier during the 1973 
oil crisis.
Many people - U.S. officials believed that this situ-
ation had been created artificially by the Government to 
raise petrol prices. Some groups of politicians proposed 
to set the gas rationing program4 one such proponent was 
Harry Hughes, Governor of Maryland, who proposed odd-
even rationing as was used during the 1973 Oil Crisis. Sev-
eral states actually implemented this program5.  Coupons 
for gasoline rationing were printed but were never actually 
used during the 1979 crisis.
On July 15, 1979, President Jimmy Carter present-
ed his plans before the society to reduce oil imports and 
improve energy efficiency in his “Crisis of Confidence” 
speech.
Carter’s speech argued the second oil crisis was “the 
moral equivalent of war”. Several months later, in January 
1980, Carter adopted the Carter Doctrine, which declared 
that any external interference with U.S. oil interests in the 
Persian Gulf would be considered an attack on the vital 
national interests of the United States. Additionally, as part 
of his administration’s efforts at deregulation, Carter pro-
posed removing price controls that had been imposed in 
the administration of Richard Nixon before the 1973 cri-
sis. Carter agreed to remove price controls in phases; they 
were finally dismantled in 1981 under Reagan. He also said 
he would impose a windfall profit tax on oil companies. 
While the regulated price of domestic oil was kept to $6 a 
barrel, the world market price was $30.
In 1980, the U.S. Government established the Synthet-
ic Fuels Corporation to produce an alternative to imported 
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fossil fuels. Here is a base dates of 1979 oil crisis:
•  January: First emergency Crude Oil Buy-Sell Pro-
gram allocations.
•  January 16: Shah leaves Iran on vacation, never 
to return. Bakhtiar government established by the Shah to 
preside until unrest subsides.
•  January 20: Saudi Arabia announces drastic cut 
in first-quarter production. 9.5 MMBD ceiling imposed. 
Although actual cuts never reach announced levels, spot 
prices of Middle East light crudes rise 36 percent.
•  January 20: One million Iranians march in Tehran 
in a show of support for the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini, 
fundamental Muslim leader.
•  February 12: Bakhtiar resigns as prime minister of 
Iran after losing support of the military.
•  March 5: Iran resumes petroleum exports.
•  Spring: Gasoline shortage/world oil glut.
•  March 26: OPEC makes full 14.5 percent price in-
crease for 1979 effective on April 1. Marker crude rose to 
$14.56 per barrel.
•  May: United States Department of Energy (DOE) 
announces $5 per barrel entitlement to importers of heat-
ing oil. Saudi Arabia announces intention to increase direct 
sales and to sell less through Aramco. Both announcements 
send prices higher.
•  June 1: Phased oil price decontrol begins. Involves 
gradual 28 month increase of “old” oil price ceilings, and 
slower rate of increase of “new” oil price ceilings.
•  June 26-28: OPEC raises prices average of 15 per-
cent, effective July 1.
•  October: Buy-Sell Program sales average more 
than 400,000 B/D from October 1979 through March 1980 
- highest level since February 1976, due to emergency al-
locations.
•  October: Canada eliminates light crude oil exports 
to U.S. refiners, except for those exports required by opera-
tional constraints of pipelines.
•  November 4: Iran takes western hostages.
•  November 12: U.S. President Jimmy Carter orders 
cessation of Iranian imports to U.S.
•  November 15: Iran cancels all contracts with U.S. 
oil companies.
•  December 13: Saudi Arabia raises marker crude 
price to $24 per barrel. (Tedoradze “OPEC in the World oil 
market”, 2011). 
This crisis has an impact on the world economy which 
was emphasized in:
1.  Worldwide economy growth slightly decreased 
from 4.7% in 1978 to 4% in 1979 to reach 0.8% in 1982.
2.  Greater fluctuation in the international trade, from 
5.2% to -3.1% in 1982.
3.  US GDP growth fell by 0.23% in 1980 and unem-
ployment in the US rose from 5.8% in 1979 to 7.6% in 
1981 and 9.7% in 1982. Also US inflation rose from 7.6% 
in 1978 to 13.5% in 1980. (Tedoradze “OPEC in the World 
oil market”, 2011). 
The Collapse of Oil Prices in the 1980s and the Low 
Prices of the 1990s
In the early 80-ies of the last century prices for oil con-
tinued to grow by inertia to a large extent. This was due 
to currency factors: pricing is in U.S. dollars and the rate 
of dollar against other currencies have increased by about 
50%, which in its turn have influenced on the purchasing 
power of selling oil for dollars against European or Japa-
nese export goods. But by 1983-84 the market began to 
dominate the hidden factors weaken OPEC. 
The oil glut began in the early 1980s as a result of 
slowed economic activity in industrial countries and the 
energy conservation spurred by high fuel prices (U.S. 
News & World Report, 1980-08-18). 
In June 1981, The New York Times stated an “Oil 
glut! ... is here” (Robert D Hershey, 1981-06-21) and Time 
Magazine stated: “the world temporarily floats in a glut of 
oil,” (Byron, 1981-06-22) though the next week an article 
in The New York Times warned that the word “glut” was 
misleading, and that in reality, while temporary surpluses 
had brought down prices somewhat, prices were still well 
above pre-energy crisis levels. (Yergin, 1981-06-28). This 
sentiment was echoed in November 1981, when the CEO 
of Exxon Corp also characterized the glut as a temporary 
surplus, and that the word “glut” was an example of “our 
American penchant for exaggerated language.” He wrote 
that the main cause of the glut was declining consumption. 
In the United States, Europe and Japan, oil consumption 
had fallen 13% from 1979 to 1981, due to “in part, in re-
action to the very large increases in oil prices by the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and other oil 
exporters,” continuing a trend begun during the 1973 price 
increases. (C. C. Garvin, 1981)
After 1980, reduced demand and overproduction pro-
duced a glut on the world market, causing a six-year-long 
decline in oil prices culminating with a 46 percent price 
drop in 1986.
OPEC and the 2000-th Uprising Price Trend for Oil
From the mid-1980s to September 2003, the inflation-
adjusted price of a barrel of crude oil on NYMEX was 
generally under $25/barrel. During 2003, the price rose 
above $30, reached $60 by August 11, 2005, and peaked 
at $147.30 in July 2008. Commentators attributed these 
price increases to many factors, including reports from the 
United States Department of Energy and others showing a 
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decline in petroleum reserves, (“Record oil price sets the 
scene for $200 next year”, 2006) worries over peak oil, 
(EnergyBulletin.net), Middle East tension, and oil price 
speculation. 
For a time, geo-political events and natural disasters 
indirectly related to the global oil market had strong short-
term effects on oil prices, such as North Korean missile 
tests, the 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, (BBC 
News , 2008) worries over Iranian nuclear program in 
2006, (BBC News, 2006), Hurricane Katrina, ( CRS Re-
port for Congress) and various other factors. By 2008, such 
pressures appeared to have an insignificant impact on oil 
prices given the onset of the global recession. (Sky News, 
2008). The recession caused demand for energy to shrink 
in late 2008 and early 2009 and the price plunged as well. 
However, it surged back in May 2009, bringing it back to 
November 2008 levels. (Lammers, 2009). 
The price of crude oil in 2003 traded in a range be-
tween $20–$30/bbl. Between 2003 and July 2008, prices 
steadily rose, reaching $100/bbl in late 2007, tying the pre-
vious all time inflation-adjusted record set in 1980. A steep 
rise in the price of oil in 2008 - also mirrored by other 
commodities - culminated in an all time high of $147.27 
during trading on July 11, 2008, more than a third above 
the previous inflation-adjusted high. (Tedoradze, OPEC in 
the World oil market.Master thesis., 2011). 
High oil prices and economic weakness contributed to 
a demand contraction in 2007-2008. In the United States, 
gasoline consumption declined by 0.4% in 2007, then fell 
by 0.5% in the first two months of 2008 alone. Record-
setting oil prices in the first half of 2008 and economic 
weakness in the second half of the year prompted a 1.2 mil-
lion bbl/day contraction in US consumption of petroleum 
products, representing 5.5% of total US consumption, the 
largest decline since 1980 at the climax of the 1979 energy 
crisis. (“Short-Term Energy Outlook”, 2009). 
According to informed observers, OPEC, meeting in 
early December, 2007, seemed to desire a high but stable 
price that would deliver substantial needed income to the 
oil producing states, but avoid prices so high that they 
would negatively impact the economies of the oil consum-
ing nations. A range of 70–80 dollars a barrel was suggest-
ed by some analysts to be OPEC’s goal. (Mouawad, 2007). 
Some analysts point out that major oil exporting coun-
tries are rapidly developing; and because they are using 
more oil domestically, less oil may be available on the in-
ternational market. This effect, outlined in the export land 
economic model, could significantly reduce the oil avail-
able for trade and cause prices to continue to rise. Particu-
larly significant are Indonesia (which is now a net importer 
of oil), Mexico and Iran (where demand is projected to 
exceed production in about 5 years), and Russia (whose 
domestic petroleum demand is growing rapidly) (Krauss, 
2007). 
In May 2008, T. Boone Pickens, an influential oil in-
vestor who believes the world’s oil output is about to peak, 
predicted oil prices would hit $150 a barrel by the end of 
the year. “Eighty-five million barrels of oil a day is all the 
world can produce, and the demand is 87 m,” Mr. Pickens 
said in an interview with CNBC. “It’s just that simple”. 
(Pickens: Oil Going to $150, So Move to Gas). 
In June 2008, Alexei Miller, head of Russian energy 
giant Gazprom, warned that the price of oil is likely to hit 
$250 a barrel sometime in 2009. Miller said that while 
speculation had played a role in oil prices, “this influence 
was not decisive.” Bloomberg reported that, as of mid-
June, “At least 3,008 options contracts have been pur-
chased giving holders the right to buy oil at $250 a barrel in 
December”. (“Gazprom CEO’s $250 Oil Forecast Is Doom 
Traders Love”, 2008). 
Also in June 2008, Shukri Ghanem, head of Libya’s 
National Oil Corporation, said: “I think it [the oil price] 
will go higher. That is a trend that will continue for some 
time. The easy, cheap oil is over, peak oil is looming.” (Do-
mestic energy bills expected to soar as cost of oil keeps 
increasing). 
On June 26, 2008, OPEC President Chakib Khelil said 
in an interview: “I forecast prices probably between $150-
170 during this summer. That will perhaps ease towards the 
end of the year.” Iran’s OPEC governor Mohammad-Ali 
Khatibi predicts that the price of oil would reach $150 a 
barrel by the end of this summer6. 
In November, as prices fell below $60 a barrel, the In-
ternational Energy Agency (IEA) warned that falling prices 
may create both a lack of investment in new sources of oil 
and a fall in production of more expensive unconventional 
reserves such as the tar sands of Canada. The IEA’s chief 
economist warned, “Oil supplies in the future will come 
more and more from smaller and more difficult fields,” 
meaning that future production requires more investment 
every year. A lack of new investment in such projects, 
which had already been observed, could eventually cause 
new and more severe supply issues than had been expe-
rienced in the early 2000s according to the IEA. Because 
the sharpest production declines had been seen in devel-
oped countries, the IEA warned that the greatest growth 
in production was expected to come from smaller projects 
in OPEC states, raising their world production share from 
44% in 2008 to a projected 51% in 2030. The IEA also 
pointed out that demand from the developed world may 
have also peaked, so that future demand growth was likely 
to come from developing nations such as China, contribut-
ing 43%, and India and the Middle East, each about 20%). 
(Carola Hoyos, 2008). 
Timothy Kailing argued against the IEA’s earlier pre-
dictions in a 2008 Journal of Energy Security research. He 
pointed out the difficulty of increasing production even 
with vastly increased investment in exploration and pro-
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duction in mature petroleum regions. By looking back at 
the historical response of production to variation in drill-
ing effort, this analysis claimed that very little increase of 
production could be attributed to increase drilling. This 
was due to a tight the quantitative relationship of diminish-
ing returns with increasing drilling effort: as drilling effort 
increased, the energy obtained per active drill rig was re-
duced according to a severely diminishing power law. This 
fact means that even an enormous increase of drilling ef-
fort is unlikely to lead to significantly increased oil and gas 
production in a mature petroleum region like the United 
States. (D., December, 2008). 
In its 2008 World Energy Outlook, the (IEA) predicted 
a rate of decline in output from the world’s existing oil-
fields of 6.7% a year. (George Monbiot asks FatihBirol, 
chief economist of IEA, when will the oil run out? ). 
Within the context of this paper it might be interesting 
to bring the Hubbert’s “peak theory” predicted in 1956 that 
oil production would peak in the United States between 
1965 and 1970. (Hubbert M. , March 7-8-9, 1956). Hub-
bert further predicted a worldwide peak at “about half a 
century” from publication and approximately 12 gigabar-
rels (GB) a year in magnitude, though he revised this esti-
mate in 1974 to 40-Gb/yr in 1995. (National Geographic, 
1974) “if current trends continue”. In a 1976 TV interview 
Hubbert added that the actions of OPEC might flatten the 
global production curve but this would only delay the peak 
for perhaps 10 years.
Commodities trader Raymond Learsy, author of Over 
a Barrel: Breaking the Middle East Oil Cartel, contends 
that OPEC has trained consumers to assume that oil is a 
much more finite resource than it is believed. To back his 
argument, he points to past false alarms and apparent collu-
sion. (National Review, 2003). He also believes that Peak 
Oil analysts are conspiring with OPEC and the oil com-
panies to create a “fabricated drama of peak oil” in order 
to drive up oil prices and profits. It is worth noting oil had 
risen to a little over $30/barrel at that time. A counter-argu-
ment was given in the Huffington Post after he and Steve 
Andrews, co-founder of ASPO, debated on CNBC in June 
2007. (Huffington Post, 2007). 
In October 2007, with oil prices in the United States 
over $90 per barrel, the Energy Watch Group, a German 
research group founded by MP Hans-Josef Fell, released 
a report claiming that oil production peaked in 2006 and 
will decline by several percent annually. The authors pre-
dict negative economic effects and social unrest as a result. 
(Seager, 2007). 
Some have argued that it will be difficult to see peak 
oil coming because many international actors including 
governments, oil producers, and other corporations have 
some incentives to create uncertainty regarding the amount 
of oil reserves that remain. This uncertainty can create in-
accuracies in market prices because the markets depend on 
accurate and timely information. These authors suggest in-
creased transparency of oil production in the oil producing 
states. (The Register-Guard, 2008). 
International Financial Crises (2008 – 2010) and 
OPEC
Early in September 2008, prices had fallen to $110. 
OPEC secretary Abdalla El-Badri said that he intended to 
cut output by about 500,000 barrels a day, which he saw 
as correcting a “huge oversupply” due to declining econo-
mies and a stronger U.S. dollar. On September 10, the In-
ternational Energy Agency (IEA) lowered its 2009 demand 
forecast by 140,000 barrels to 87.6 million barrels a day. 
(Kwiatkowski, September 10, 2008)
As many countries throughout the world entered eco-
nomic recession in the third quarter of 2008, prices contin-
ued to slide. In November and December global demand 
growth fell, and U.S. demand fell 10% overall from early 
October to early November 2008 (accompanying a signifi-
cant drop in auto sales).
In their December meeting, OPEC planned to reduce 
their production by 2.2 million barrels per day, though they 
admitted their resolution to reduce production in October 
had only an 85% compliance rate.
Petroleum prices had fallen to below $35 in February 
2009, but on May 6, 2009 had risen back to mid-November 
2008 levels at about $56. During the next years, oil price 
was continuing to increase. For example, the average price 
of oil in January of 2012 was on average about $ 100 per 
barrel. (Oil.com, 2012). The global economic downturn 
left oil storage facilities fuller than in any year since 1990, 
when Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait upset the market.
Not all non-’peakists’ believe there will be endless 
abundance of oil. Cambridge Energy Research Associ-
ates, for example, which counts unconventional sources 
in reserves while discounting EROEI, believes that global 
production will eventually follow an “undulating plateau” 
for one or more decades before declining slowly. In 2005 
the group had predicted that “petroleum supplies will be 
expanding faster than demand over the next five years.” 
(Christian Science Monitor, 2005). 
According to Chevron Chief Technology Officer Don 
Paul, it is widely believed that peak oil will happen “by 
2020”. (Greentech Media, 2007). 
Conclusion
From the above-mentioned the following conclusions 
can be drawn:
 
As studies revealed, Cartel is the most appropriate 
word to OPEC but it has an individual character. The clas-
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sical model of cartel is not working with OPEC because 
the theory is oriented and developed in case of Firm Cartel. 
If the wishes and aspirations of countries not OPEC 
members to unite they would oppose OPEC on the world 
market successfully but this is prevented by political fac-
tors, those countries don’t have same ideology and goals. 
Production quotas are one possible response. If de-
mand grows, or some producers supply less oil, OPEC can 
increase its oil production to prevent a sudden growing the 
prices or short fall in supply. OPEC might also reduce its 
oil production in response to market conditions, as a means 
of countering falling prices.
OPEC doesn’t have specific regulations of voting and 
allocation process. Neither OPEC statue nor other stand-
ing orders contain the description of this issue. That’s why 
we have to summarize the OPEC’s final meeting report. 
It seems from given examples that OPEC uses the simple 
majority system. It will be extremely simple to explain 
only with this words the system of voting if we go through 
the issue deeper it will be found out that this is very com-
plicated and inexhaustible.
While in taking decision OPEC based on two back-
wards:
•  On the one hand maximization goal of profit and
•  Other hand interests of each member countries 
It’s too complicated to reach balance between of these 
two sides. Saudi Arabia as a core producer and exporter 
which has main role takes the responsibility for itself.
Absence of voting rules and problems connected with 
it clearly revealed in OPEC’s quota system decision, where 
OPEC prefers to “close eye” to the cheating in order to 
avoid the official precedent of quoting changes. The cases 
of Nigeria and Iraq happen only once because these coun-
tries have their own political and economical problems.
1. Ecuador suspended its Membership in December 1992 and reactivated it 
in December 2007. Gabon, which became a Full Member in 1975, termi-
nated its Membership with effect from 1 January 1995. Indonesia, which 
became a Full Member in 1962, suspended its Membership in December 
2008.
2. The gallon is a measure of volume equal In (≈ 3.78 L)
3. The conclusions are based on IMF statistical annual publications.
4. Only people with an odd-numbered license plate could purchase gas on 
an odd-numbered day
5. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Texas
6. OPEC governor: Oil to hit $150, Press TV
12
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